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1929 and 2009: Two 
Commensurable Crises?
PIERLUIGI CIOCCA 
WE ALREADY HAVE data on the economic activity, income distribution, prices, fi nance extended throughout the world over the last two centuries in which a market economy has been affi rmed. This empirical heritage 
allows us to draw a historical sketch of the economic instability oriented to the 
comparison between 1929 and 2009.
It would be useful to move from the distinction of instability respectively 
concerning prices, production, and fi nance.
a) Prices. For our purposes, more infl ation discloses defl ation. It is usual 
to distinguish a “good” defl ation, resulting from the expansion of the demand, 
and a “bad” defl ation, which results from a decrease in the global demand. The 
1875-95 defl ation was a good Great Defl ation, not a “Great Depression”. The 
consumer prices fell by approximately 20% in the industrial countries. But the 
world GDP grew by 2 percent per year, compared with the thinner 1 percent 
of 1820-70. The bad defl ation followed, instead of the demand collapse of 
1929-33. It was much stronger: in just 4 years the world wholesale prices fell by 
approximately 40%, and the consumer prices of industrial countries decreased 
by 25%.
But from the point of view of its interaction with the fi nancial and 
actual crises, even the good defl ation… is extremely bad! It is so from the 
macroeconomic point of view, beyond the effects of distribution that are favorable 
to the fi xed income it tends to provoke. In defl ation, although the nominal 
interest is next to zero, the real cost of the debt escalates. The debtors become 
insolvent and are still forced to sell off assets to avoid repaying their creditors with 
a revalued currency. The companies cut their investments.
Today the bad defl ation remains only a risk, although, with an estimate 
of infl ation for 2009 (proposed by the International Monetary Fund on 28 
January) of 0.3%, the advanced economies are skating on really thin ice. The 
central bankers, those European in the fi rst place, are called to combat the risk 
of defl ation with the same commitment with which they have opposed infl ation, 
having succeeded in raising interest rates just last summer, when the European 
economy was already recovering from recession. The maintenance of the nominal 
wages will be decisive in face of the thrust toward a decrease in prices that will 
lead to an increased unemployment.
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b) Production. The trends of productive activities must distinguish 
between the physiological corridor of fl uctuations that are only cyclical, 
or accidental, and the deep, durable, extended contractions. We must also 
distinguish the nineteenth century, still very agricultural and already not little 
tertiary, from the industrial 20th century, more than tertiary. In the 1800s, the 
recessions were more frequent, also acute, but short. In a worldwide scale there 
were three annual negative points in the deviations from the trend of the actual 
product: in 1835 (-8%), in 1853 (-8%), and in 1870 (-4%). In the 1900s, strong 
and prolonged contractions associated to the trend coincided with the end of 
World War I (-7%) and of World War II (-11%).
The primacy belongs, of course, to the 1929-33 period. The difference 
between the world GDP and its trend came very close to 12 percent. Between 
1929 and the 1932-33 period, the GDP decreased 30% in the United States, 
15% in Latin America, 9% in Europe, 5% in Italy. It remained stable in the Soviet 
Union and Asia. In the world the level of 1932 was 17 percent lower than that 
of 1929. The factors that precipitated it were especially the investments and the 
production of capital goods. In the United States - the extreme case - the supply 
of capital goods decreased 55%, in face of the 20% of that of consumer goods 
(but the decrease was of 70% on what concerned to vehicles). The industrial 
production decreased, of course, more than the GDP: 40% in Germany and the 
United States, 23 percent in Western Europe and Italy. The international trade 
decreased by a quarter in quantity, and by almost two-thirds in value. Capital 
movements and migratory fl ows were reduced to zero. It is estimated – the 
appraisals are uncertain - that on a global scale the number of the unemployed 
tripled between 1929 and 1933 and that the industrial unemployment rate, on 
average, exceeded the 20% detected during the entire span of the 1930s.
The recovery was in fact slow, and rough. The world manufacturing 
production did not return to the values of 1929, previous to 1937. The recovery 
was also diversifi ed in terms of the various factors that, in individual countries, 
supported the demand. In each economy, support derived mainly from the 
resumption of the credit supply and the competitive devaluations, more than 
from defi cit spending. Keynes was still moving from the ever orthodox Treatise on 
Money (1930) to the revolutionary General Theory (1936). In the United States, 
the somehow confused activism of Roosevelt was less taken into consideration 
than the need of rearmament on the eve of the war.
Coming closer to the present, from 1950 to 2007 the world GDP has 
never declined in particular years, although a negative residue from the trend 
of 2-3% could be detected in 1958,1975, 1980, and 1991. For 2008, the IMF 
estimates indicate a slowdown in the world GDP growth, but always within the 
range of 3.4 percent. Those estimates indicate a 4.1% expansion in trade as well. 
Some advanced economies, however, have been in a technical recession, with the 
GDP in decline for at least two quarters. For 2009, the IMF foresees a minimum 
growth of the world economy: 0.5%. It would result from an expansion of 
ESTUDOS AVANÇADOS 23 (66), 2009 83
3.3% in emerging economies (with China in 6.7) and a sharp decrease (-2.0) in 
advanced economies (with the United States in -1.6). In this sense, the current 
crisis is more of the OECD area - particularly in the United States, Europe, 
Japan - than of the global economy, although the volume of the world trade has 
also been foreseen in decline, of 2.8%. In the fourth quarter of 2009, compared 
to the same period of 2008, the advanced economies would still experience an 
attenuated negative variation of GDP (-0.5 percent). In 2010, however, the world 
product would return to the pace of development of 2008 (3.4%), while infl ation 
would come close to 1%.
The scenario outlined by the IMF is not only a little uncertain, but 
the sense of its forecast is that a contraction in a global scale would be, in the 
present situation, unlikely. These projections, it should be noted, do not take into 
consideration the ulterior expansive policies that can be decided from now on, 
in 2009, with immediate effects on the expectations. It should be noted as well 
that, unlike 1929, the movements of capital and migratory fl ows have not been 
reduced to zero, there is no trace of competitive devaluations (in fact, the dollar 
has strengthened), and the actual rates of interest are at normal levels.
Two additional terms of comparison may be relevant. In 1930 - the fi rst 
year of recession in the crisis of 1929-33 – the GDP decreased 5 percent both 
in the industrialized area that was the epicenter of the world recession and 
throughout the whole economy of the globe, despite the resistance in Asia and 
the growth (of 10%) in Eastern Europe. In terms of the combined difference 
between the actual product and the potential product - the most accurate 
measure of the severity of a recession - the loss of income of the advanced 
economies currently foreseen by the IMF for the 2009-2010 period (6 percent) 
is similar to those experienced in 1974-75, following the fi rst oil shock, and in 
1980-83, after the second one.
c) Finances. On the front of the prices and production, the similarity 
between the current phase and the dramatic crisis of 1929 seems not to be well 
founded. More complicated is, instead, the comparison between the two crises on 
what concerns to the instability of values of assets, banking, and fi nances.
In the framework of the normal fl uctuations from multiplier-accelerator, 
but also independently from the cycle, the mechanics of the fi nancial crises is 
unique. It is characterized by a standard model, long ago improved, after Henry 
Thornton (1802), by Bagehot, Wicksell, Hawtrey, Fisher, Keynes, Minsky, 
and Kindleberger. An unexpected event opens new expectations of profi t. The 
speculation in the stock exchange increases; powered by an inevitably elastic 
offer of credit, it becomes excessive. When - inevitably – the excess begins to 
become evident, people start to sell off in a hurry to repay their debts, due to 
the expectations of defl ation and the most expensive actual interest rates. Now 
the prices of the object of speculation - which can be of any kind: products, 
real estate, lands, stocks, bonds, contracts, betting - collapse. The vicious cycle 
is interrupted when trust is restored by the economic policy, or simply returns 
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by itself. The ultimate meaning of the model is that instability is rooted in 
capitalism. Crises may result in healing, moderation, deceleration, but certainly 
never prevention.
In the current crisis the speculative excess has focused on houses and on 
loans proposed by the banks to fi ve million poor families in America, as well on 
real state in other Western countries, on derivatives and on the “toxic” securities 
almost everywhere. Eighty years ago, the speculative excess was based on stocks, 
mainly the industrial ones. The propensity toward excessive indebtedness – of 
households, businesses, speculators - found, as always, an offer of credit by banks 
and other institutions with segments of uncontrollable elasticity.
In a striking contrast to the morphological regularity characterized by the 
standard model, the empirical casuistry of the crises is of a disarming variety. Each 
crisis is specifi c, in its forms, in its times, in its severity, in its political and social 
repercussions. In this sense, they are a subject of history rather than of theory.
The stages of the really serious worldwide fi nancial crises that preceded 
the current one have been three: 1873-1878, 1889-1894, and 1921-1933. The 
fi rst and third coincided and the second did not coincide with a subsidence of the 
GDP at international level. In fact, historically the fi nancial imbalances that have 
failed to result in a decrease in income are not rare. The crises were limited by 
events or measures that reestablished trust in time.
There was a lapse of two centuries between the case of London in 1793 
and that of Wall Street in 1987, but an outside intervention was decisive in 
both occasions. In 1793 the panic spread in the city in response to the crack of 
banks operating out of London. The demand for the Bank of England tickets 
grew beyond measure, for precautionary reasons; the constraint quickly became 
extremely harsh. But the chain of bank disruptions was broken and did not 
extend to the world of production. All it took was the Parliament announcement 
to make available solvent merchant titles of the exchequer, which could be quickly 
and easily liquidated: currency with paper money. In October 1987, the collapse 
of the historical supremacy of the races to Wall Street for stock – worse than 
in October 1929 - was blocked by the prompt sign correction of the American 
monetary policy, implemented by Greenspan. The input of liquidity avoided 
damage to the productive activity.
Other episodes of fi nancial tension, which had reappeared by accident or 
by outside intervention, occurred in England in 1797, 1810, and 1825; in France 
in 1818; in the United States and Europe in 1857; again in England in 1866 
and 1890; in Italy in 1907, despite an 80% decrease in the stock exchange index 
between that year and the so-called “radiant days” of May 1915.
For not going so back in time, after 1987 the damage to the international 
economy resulting from the fi nancial crises in Asia, Latin-America, Eastern 
Europe, of the EMS (European Monetary System), the LTCM (Long Term 
Capital Management), was restrained. Also in these cases, there was a valuable 
contribution from the Federal Reserve of Alan Greenspan.
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On the contrary, when a sharp productive contraction occurred – 
especially if combined, as in 1929, to a price defl ation - it has not failed to 
interact with a fi nancial crisis. The so-called “1929 crisis″ was the heaviest in 
scale and duration, also in the fi nancial dimension. It can be quantifi ed with 
the sum of the increased bank losses for the GDP of a representative year and 
with the decrease of the races to stocks, which were defl ated for the consumer 
prices. Between 1921 and 1933, in the two countries that, until then, presented 
the higher fi nancial instability among those that are developed today - Italy 
and the United States -, the bank losses – which were ascertained years after 
by accountants and courts - were equal to 5% of the GDP in the United States 
and to 8.5% in Italy; the stock exchanges collapsed, 50% in Italy from 1925 to 
1932, as in the United States in 1929-33 (-85% the nominal values, -30% the 
consumer prices). In Italy it was necessary to resort to the heterodox solution of 
the IRI (Internationalized Resource Identifi er), which avoided the bank panic 
experienced in the United States and that today, mutatis mutandis, is arousing 
interest again, even outside Italy.
For individual small or emerging countries the picture is in fact greatly 
varied, with much more serious aspects than the two cases mentioned above. 
Austria, already in 1931, acknowledged bank losses associated to Kredit-Anstalt 
– a big bank in a small economy - equal to 9% of the GDP. In the last quarter 
of the 1900s, in Italy - merit of Via Nazionale - the accumulated cost of the 
bank crises had not exceeded 1.5% of the GDP for a representative year. But 
among the industrial countries that in those 25 years have experienced crises, 
the Italian fi gure is lower not only to the limit cases of Spain (17% of the GDP), 
Japan (12%), Finland (10%), but also to those - between 2 and 5% of the GDP - 
Sweden, Norway, United States, France, Australia. In the same period, a hundred 
economies in developing countries have experienced fi nancial crises. In those 
countries the costs of the crises have not been lower than many points of the 
GDP, with a modal value of 15 points. The costs have come to correspond to a 
third of the GDP in Thailand and Turkey, a half or a little less in the extreme 
cases of Argentina and Chile in the early 1980s. It is not easy to situate the 
current fi nancial crisis in this large scale of severity. The crisis is not resolved, the 
estimates of the losses are imprecise, part of those already counted - at the fair 
value – in regard to “toxic” securities that the markets underestimate or even do 
not evaluate for now. Above all, the crisis has sprung out and, in spite of being 
concentrated on the Anglo-Saxon fi nance, assumed also a wide international, if 
not “global”, dimension.
The drop in the defl ated stock prices in the main stock exchanges - 50% 
- is, today already, similar to that of 80 years ago. According to the IMF, the 
losses suffered by international banks so far are equal to 780 billion dollars 
(entirely covered with provisions of capital, the public ones of 350 billion, the 
private ones of 438 billion). The further anticipated losses will not exceed 500 
billion for the banks of the United States and Europe. The global system of 
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credit intermediaries could lose 2,200 billion only on investments (over a half 
of them of a hypothecary nature) carried out in the USA. If – although they 
are not - these latest losses were limited to the American intermediaries, since 
the American GDP is equal to 14 thousand billion, the relative weight of the 
losses would be much greater (16% of the GDP) than that of the Twenties and 
Thirties, always in the United States. But the American GDP does not greatly 
exceed the 20% of the global one, which is next to 65 thousand billions of 
dollars. And even 2,200 billion do not exceed… much the 3 percent of 65 
thousand. The denominator counts. If you change the denominator, the capital 
and reserves of the banks of Europe alone exceed 2 thousand billions of dollars. 
The capitalization of the banking system of the whole world is estimated at over 
5 thousand billion. So that this capital, clearly above the total losses, can fl ow 
and compensate the negative gains of the intermediaries in diffi culty, the strong 
banks of any country - or the sovereign funds – should be able to recapitalize the 
weak banks of that country.
We are living, therefore, a complex and particularly extended fi nancial 
crisis, although not yet the most serious in history. At the same time, this is 
a crisis of the essential type, which can be inscribed in the standard model. 
Its specifi c nature is, as it always occurs in crises, the subject and forms of 
speculation: simple loans for the purchase of modest homes, complicated “toxic” 
securities, derivative contracts that most people cannot understand. It also 
concerns – and this is a real new element - the accounting modality of the fair 
value: a modality that is conceptually preferable to the historical cost, but based 
on the assumption that the markets to whose assets it applies do not cease to 
express quotations, or reasonable quotations. As all fi nancial crises, the current 
one was not foreseeable - and was not foreseen -, at least not in the times, in the 
ways, in the entities, or in the sequences. Above all, it was not preventable with 
rules, economic policies, and controls. Rules and supervision are able to cope 
with the known risks, historically tested, that are engaged in by commercial 
banks. Their power, however, is close to inexistent against the risks taken in 
the fi nancial markets and against the risks of a new type, taken by banks and 
markets. The banks and, above all, the markets were never, on a global scale, 
adjusted both for stability and, in particular, for transparency and correctness 
in the operators’ behavior. But, in the offer of fi nances, there is always an 
innovative, opaque, immoderately avid aspect. Furthermore, it is not possible to 
limit – who could criticize them? - the propensity of businesses and families to 
load themselves of debt. In face of a serious fi nancial crisis, with an international 
dimension, manageable but certainly not easily so, it must be observed that, 
according to the most credited forecasts, a contraction of the world economy, in 
the 1929 style, should not be feared. Not if we share the forecast, at this time 
prevailing among the analysts, of a recovery in the course of 2009 and 2010. 
Why? Where is the deep difference between now and then? One could envisage 
a double answer. The pre-existing imbalances in the actual economy are different 
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from those of the 1920s. In addition, both the effi cacy of the policies that 
stabilize the actual economy and the confi dence in this effectiveness are, thanks 
to Keynes, much higher.
The unique severity of the 1930s contraction had its roots in imbalances in 
the previous decade. The 1920s had seen four structural changes that had shown 
themselves as seriously and potentially cyclic in the course of the next decade: 
a) the fragility and lack of cooperation in the reestablished gold standard; b) the 
imbalances in the balances of payments - including the German retrievals - and 
the absence of a country that could provide a last resort, in the trade and in the 
credit; c) the increased weight of the durable consumptions in the United States 
(fi nanced at rates), the extensive offer of primary products in Canada, Argentina, 
New Zealand, and in the very United States, as well as an excessive capacity in the 
industrial production, had multiplied in Europe during World War I; d) fi nally, 
the stiffening of the labor market in the United States. These and other structural 
weaknesses were prospective reasons for the stagnation of the real demand. As 
Steindl, Sweezy, and Sylos Labini would, by different routes, theorize later, these 
factors made unsustainable the profi ts of the 1920s in the long run. Finally, in the 
economic thinking - with Pigou, Hayek, Einaudi, Robbins – the pre-Keynesian 
idea prevailed that the crisis would have to follow its natural course and that the 
market economy, with the fl exibility of prices, interest rates and wages, possessed 
rebalancing mechanisms that it would be wise not to upset. For the practical 
thinkers and for the persons in charge of the economic policy, therefore, there 
is no sense in talking about “errors”, as Friedman has done by imputing the 
1929 crisis to the premature death of Benjamin Strong, the wise leader of the 
Federal Reserve System in New York. The theory of reference was wrong. The 
decisions of the policy makers should not have been based on it, to begin by 
Herbert Hoover, the unlucky President of the United States during the crisis, the 
“Great Engineer”, the technocrat … Unfortunately deeply learned in economics, 
certainly much more than Roosevelt, the lawyer. The spark that had triggered the 
potential of crises accumulated in the 1920s, then, was the restrictive orientation 
assumed by the United States’ monetary policy in 1928. In face of the increasing 
stock speculation, the Federal Reserve System sterilized the infl ows of gold: a 
small tail wagged by a mastiff.
Today we have reached the fi nancial crisis essentially with a structural 
macroeconomic imbalance: the huge net indebtedness towards neighboring 
countries of the leader country, the United States. The potential seriousness of 
a genuine collapse of the dollar, of a sudden rise of interest rates, of a disruptive 
and contagious stagfl ation in the United States, has been denounced for years, 
in particular by Europeans. In the same Financial Stability Forum, established 
in 1999 for the coordination of the international fi nancial supervision, the 
fears were focused on this macroscopic imbalance rather than on the real estate 
speculation, on hedge funds and on off-shore centers. And, however, the risk 
was calculated. It was calculated by the currently scorned Greenspan, whose 
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monetary policy and banking supervision policy have also, moreover, allowed 
the United States an annual growth of 3% for two decades and has eliminated, 
on many occasions, potentially acute and widespread fi nancial crises. In face 
of the European apathy, the development of the United States, together with 
the Chinese one, has strengthened the world economy. That risk was especially 
calculated in the actual concert between the foreign policy of the United States 
- the great debtor - and that of China and Japan, the main creditors. At least so 
far, this balance, although precarious, is holding, and there was no collapse of the 
dollar. The spark that has knocked over the expectations of speculators on loans, 
securities and derivatives was not the dollar, but, perhaps, the unforeseeable and 
diffi cult to understand decision of the Bush administration to lead the Lehman 
fi nancial organization to bankruptcy.
Some considerations, desperately aiming at seeing glimmers of light at the 
end of the tunnel, may justify the forecast, perhaps relatively benign, of the IMF:
1) China, the new engine of the world growth, true provider of the last 
resort, increasingly aware of being so.
2) The downward resilience of the wages, and therefore of the prices, in 
industrial countries.
3) By contrast, the downward fl exibility of the international quotations of 
energy.
4) The moderation of the actual real interest rates in the long term, in the 
absence of price defl ation.
5) The fact that the companies’ condition of debt, unlike that of the 
families, is relatively contained. In 2007, on the eve of the crisis, in the 
same United States, the companies’ indebtedness was - like in Italy 
and Germany - less than ¾ of the GDP, compared to values close to or 
over 100% in Japan, France, United Kingdom, and Spain. The debts 
of the American companies were also equal to 35% of their liabilities 
(relationships of leverage, to market prices), - as in France - compared 
to 40% in the other countries that were mentioned: values, though, 
not higher than those found on average in the previous decade. Still 
in the United States, the indebtedness of the families in relation to the 
available income was equal to 1.45 (1.03 in 2000): a value much higher 
than average in the euro area (0.93; 0.74 in 2000), although lower 
than that of the United Kingdom (1.60; 1.03 in 2000) and to that, 
abnormal, of the Netherlands (2.40; 1.60 in 2000).
6) The prevalence of the inside credit over the outside credit. A 
greater share than in the past concerns fi nancial relations between 
intermediaries. It does not directly affect the fi nal unit of expenses, 
families and businesses. Furthermore, the derivative contracts with 
speculative, and not ensuring, purposes, often take on the form of a 
betting, with a loser that will perhaps spend less, but also with a winner 
that can spend more. It is similar to the 1944 criticism by Kalecki - 
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more inside money than outside money - to the real balance effect 
of Pigou.
7) Finally, a copy of the General Theory… It can be found in all libraries, 
including those of Frankfurt. It is available to government leaders 
and central bankers, hopefully more pragmatic than the neoclassic 
economists. Based on Keynes and on our own experience, we 
know how to avoid a strong contraction in the economic activity. 
Productive public investments and temporary tax reductions with high 
progressiveness, combined to the release of the interbank and credit 
offer that was rendered elastic, providing liquidity, guarantees and 
capital to intermediaries, constitute the dam, to be consolidated and 
raised at the earliest, to contain the recession wave. The Ultima Thule is 
the “theorem of Haavelmo”, inherent in the fact that, today, the public 
expenditure is of around 40% of world GDP, not less than 20% as in the 
1930s. A really special non-Keynesian skill would be required, so that 
the policy makers of the United States, Europe and Japan fail to prevent 
a deeper and longer contraction than that, already serious, foreseen 
today.
Not even the more reasonable optimism, of course, can fail to recognize 
that this crisis may prove strongly recessive. The fi nal outcome is unpredictable, 
as the crises of capitalism have always been. Keynes has defi nitively clarifi ed 
that capitalism is intrinsically unstable, as well as unfair, contaminating, often 
ungovernable. It is still socially and politically accepted because, in two hundred 
years, it has proved itself able to multiply by 10 the average income per capita of 
mankind: that income that, in the course of the previous eighteen centuries, from 
Caesar Augustus to Robert Malthus, had never risen more than 40%.
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